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How Law Thinks of Disobedience: Perceiving
and Addressing Desertion and Conscientious
Objection in Israeli Military Courts
HADAR A VIRAM

The studv transcends the dichotomy "law ill the hooks"j"law in action" by
taking lu;I"s knowledge-production mechanisms seriously. It examines how the
Israeli militarl' justice system perceives and addresses disobedience tOlt'{/rd the
mandaton' militory service dUi.1' hy deserters alld conscientiolls objectors. Both
groups resist the lIIilitary service ethos but differ in the ojfenders' demographics
and !notivations. The findings show how law co-opts the socio-political prohlems,
assimilates them, and transforms them to narrolV its framework. The legal
system call be cognitiveiy open to external frameworks introduced bl' powerful
and resourceful defendants: it remains, however, Ilormative!y closed to alternative
rules and perspectives.

1. INTRODUCTION

One bright and unremarkable morning in :2000, the Israeli military court
addressed the case of a soldier who committed an unauthorized absence
from service to help his family through an economic crisis. He was one of
more than a thousand people in similar situations tried that year for desertion
and probably one of ten to twenty defendants for the same offense that
very morning. The audience seats were almost empty and the case yielded
practically no public interest. The "guilty" verdict led to a substantial
prison sentence, As part of a short, formulaic verdict, the court wrote:

------- ---

--.-.----
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The defendant's behavior is very severe and combines severe elements of taking
the law into one's own hands and a severe violation of military discipline. The
defendant's disciplinary past also cannot be ignored. nor our impression that
he did not make the most of the array of legal paths available to him before
he took the law into his own hands. (South 64/00: I)

Cases like this were tried, on a regular basis. in the years that followed.
including in the summer of 2003. when in the adjacent hall. a well-attended.
sensational trial took place. Five conscientious objectors were tried for
refusing to serve in the army due to the occupation of the territories. The
room was packed with family members and political supporters. who were
occasionally interviewed before the media cameras outside the court. The
defendants were eventually convicted, and. like the typical deserter. were
sentenced to a considerable prison sentence. In their lengthy verdict. the
court wrote:
This is ideological or political crime. and it is more severe and dangerous than
regular criminal activity stemming from a wish for personal benefit ... not
only do they disobey the law. they renounce its compulsory power. They might
be imitated by others. enjoy the support of people and public institutions.
which hinders an egalitarian enforcement of law. and might gather around
them a large public, who might be prepared to exhibit violence behavior to the
point of mutiny and rebellion against the authorized go\"ernment. that is.
democratic society. (Headquarters 151. 174. 205. 222. 243/03: 3)

What do we make of the similarities between the two types of cases? What
do we make of the differences between them? Did the court simply apply an
abstract principle-the duty to perform military sen'ice-to the soldiers'
cases? Does the verdict. therefore. reflect its formal adherence to the principle
of general deterrence and the rule of law? Or. was the verdict shaped by the
court's knowledge about the political and socio-economic situation in
Israel, or by its bureaucratic need to smoothly handle the morning's caseload
without creating dangerous precedents? Does the fact that the process-the
public attendance. the media. the procedural path of the trial-was so different
matter, in light of the similar results?
What we see in the juxtaposition of these two examples cannot be fully
captured and explained using any of the two traditional paradigms through
which mainstream scholarship has viewed law: "law in the books" and "la\\
in action" (Pound 1910). The two paradigms have been presented as
diametrically opposed to each other. and their contrast has become the
formative idea of law and society studies. the ""great di\ide" (Sarat and
Kearns 1993). "Law in the books." that is. the doctrinal. lawyerly view on
law, would argue that in both cases the court has applied a generaL universal principle-the rule of law-to the specifics of the case (convicting those
who knowingly eschew their legal duty to perform military service). By
doing so. the court weighs the different interests (upholding the law versus
considering the defendants' personal circumstances) and makes a legal
decision (Mensch 1998: Vandevelde 1996). This endogenous. doctrinal
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analysis of what law, or the court, has done in these cases, provides a
decent explanation for the similar outcomes in both cases, which support
the rule of law; however, it entirely misses the differences in context, the
way the trials progressed, and their meaning in the extra-legal world.
"Law in Action," a social science paradigm aimed at contrasting the
normative decrees of substantial and procedural law with the practices in
the field (see Banakar 2003; Cotterell 1995; Dau-Schmidt 1999; Friedman
1986; Levine 1990; Sarat and Kearns 1993; Trubek 1990), would seek to
provide an entirely different narrative to explain the two types of verdicts.
The decision to severely punish a deserter-examined in light of empirical
data pointing to a strong correlation between desertion and socio-economic
deprivation-could be interpreted as the product of class and wealth differences
in society, perpetuated and supported by the legal structure (see, e.g., Balbus
1973; Hay, Linebaugh, Rule, Thompson and Winslow 1975; Stone 1985). It
could also be explained as a product of the court's organizational structure,
in which guilty pleas, established punishment levels, and easy solutions
smooth the everyday interaction between the actors in the system (e.g.,
Blumberg 1967; Emmelman 1996; Feeley, 1973; Nardulli 1978; Sudnow
1965). On the other hand, the conviction and severe punishment of a
conscientious objector could be interpreted as the outcome of a politically
driven move to legitimize the military occupation of the territories through
the mechanisms of due process. These explanations capture some of the
realities behind the cases; however, they do not take law. and the rule of
law, seriously. They see the similar legal reasoning in both cases as a ruse, a
mechanism for legitimacy in the face of inequality and extralegal considerations
rather than taking legal reasoning itself to task and examining its meaning.
By ignoring the way in which the law thinks, traditional "law in action"
scholarship misses a rich dimension of what law, and the legal system, does.
This article is an empirical building block in a more recent tradition of
scholarship, which offers a way in which the "law in action" path can be
enriched to include a perspective that takes law, its products, and its
operations, seriously. The analysis it suggests does not comment on law's
normative objectives, in the manner of "law in the books" scholarship. Rather,
it reveals how law itself, through its ways of perceiving problems, constructing
content, and crafting logic. accounts for practices in the legal arena. Using
the examples of desertion and conscientious objection, I examine how the
military justice system uses and produces knowledge about disobedience;
how this knowledge helps it conceptualize disobedience as a criminal offense;
how it structures images of the offenders; and how its adherence to doctrinal
principles clashes with its sensitivity to extralegal factors like political
conflict and social inequalities when it addresses disobedience through the
mechanisms of the criminal justice process.
Several important works in the last few decades have made suggestions
for bridging, or transcending, the law in the books/law in action dichotomy.
Some scholars do so by examining the meaning of law on everyday lives
'<J ~()08
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(Ewick and Silbey 2000; Sarat 1990; Sarat and Keams 1993); others have
examined its symbolic value for social movements (McCann 1986, 1998). In the
context of this project, however, I use a different approach, which relies on
the scholarship of Niklas Luhmann (Luhmann 2004; Luhmann and Baecker
1995) and Gunther Teubner (1983, 1989,2001). Luhmann and Teubner see
law as a social system, which operates on the basis of endemic dichotomies
(mainly the dichotomy "legal/illegal") and concepts (Clam 2001). To them,
law is an autopoietic system; it does not engage in dialogue with other
disciplines or forms of knowledge. When law is "irritated" by concepts
from other disciplines, it co-opts and transforms them to become part of its
own knowledge-production mechanisms (Luhmann 2004) These autopoietic
characteristics make law "cognitively open" to external irritants, but "normatively closed," in the sense that, eventually, these irritants are incorporated
into the internal web of communications and dialogues (King and Piper
1990; Nobles and Schiff 2001).
The article does not aim to provide a detailed analysis of these theoretical
frameworks, nor to synthesize them with the work of other theorists who
have examined the legal field from epistemological, text-conscious perspectives,
such as Bordieu's notion of a legal "field" (1987), Fish's analysis of the law's
"formal existence" (1991), or the work of some scholars in the Foucaultian
tradition of governmentality, whose analysis of policymaking texts relies on
an ""empiricism of the surface" (Hunt and Wickham 1994; Rose 1999;
Simon 1998, 2007).' Rather, it utilizes Luhmann's perception of law insight
premise according to which law consists, at least in part, of a mechanism
for adapting and producing knowledge. This notion does not require full
acceptance of the Luhmannian premise according to which law is entirely
disconnected from extralegal concepts; nor does systems theory, as presented
by Luhmann and Teubner, account for such an alienated definition of law
(King 1995,2001). As Mariana Valverde points out,
[o]ne can reject the depiction of law as an autonomous epistemic subject
generated in the texts of autopoiesis writers and nevertheless acknowledge
Luhmann and Teubner's insights into the ways that law creatively appropriates
extralegal knowledges. Inquiring into law's knowledges, law's research methods,
would not have been possible within the limits of the critique of ideology
framework that has been so ubiquitous within progressive legal studies and
sociology of law. That framework demonstrated its power in enabling a whole
generation of critical legal studies, feminist legal analysis, queer legal scholarship,
and critical race theory. But like all frameworks, it has its limits, and these have
become more visible in recent years. The inability of this framework to see
what Luhmann and Teubner see-law's active role in constituting powers and
knowledges-has already been mentioned. This blind spot can be regarded as
the effect of a more general problem, namely, the myth of the socioeconomic
"real." (Valverde 2003: 5)

As Valverde suggests, the weakness of critical theories is in their adherence
to the "real" as a critique of legal regimes. While the enterprise of uncovering
power dynamics is worthy and important, it falls short of demonstrating
10 2008 The Author
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the legal system's power in creating realities and the machinations by which
the system creates them. This project, therefore, is an addition to the works
that draw attention to the patterns by which the "real" is constructed by
legal knowledge (King and Piper 1990; Wandall 2007). By putting the
Luhmannian understanding of law to an empirical test, I seek to show how
legal knowledge about disobedience interacts with legal policymaking. The
article uses data gathered from the legal system's communications and
products-courtroom hearings and verdicts-to uncover the inner logic and
thought patterns that lie at the base of the policies regarding deserters
and conscientious objectors. As I show here, the legal classification logic
dominates the perceptions and policies toward disobedient soldiers by
reducing, simplifying, and classifying their personalities, demographics, and
motivations. Admittedly, intellectual, middle-class defendants with a wellarticulated political agenda, like the conscientious objectors, succeed more
than weak and powerless defendants, like deserters, in presenting the extralegal
context to their disobedience. However, the internal legal system uses
similar thought patterns to make sense of both groups and eventually reduces
their differences and circumstances using established, monolithic categories.
Therefore, while the importance of power differences and professional
conflicts to the shaping of legal policies cannot be discounted, this article
argues that such external factors are eventually co-opted and modified in
their discursive interaction with formal law. The findings suggest that the
story of law's dialogue with power structures is much more complex than a
mere claim that the more powerful are treated more advantageously. The
legal response to different individuals is shaped, to a great extent by the
thought patterns and inner workings of legal discourse, at least as much as
by the interests and maneuvers of personal and professional interests of
groups and individuals.

II. THE CASE STUDY: HOW DOES THE ISRAELI MILIT AR Y JUSTICE SYSTEM
PERCEIVE. AND ADDRESS, DISOBEDIENCE TO SERVE IN THE ARMY?

The case study observes the construction of a legal concept-the criminalization
of disobedience-through the eyes of the Israeli military justice system.
While every case study has features that make it idiosyncratic and problematic
to generalize from, the subject of this article is a system that closely resembles
the Israeli civilian criminal justice system, in the tradition of Anglo-American
law. 2 The military justice system is a smaller, more specialized sibling of the
civilian one. Its jurisdiction extends over all soldiers, who are subject to
a dual system of laws: the civilian and the military criminal courts (Finkelstein
and Tomer 2002; Mudrik 1991). Military courts have priority whenever a criminal
incident has any military-related features. Soldiers can be tried in the military
system for any civilian criminal offense-from petty offenses to murder-as
well as for military offenses, which are defined in the Military Justice Act,
2008 The Author
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1955. Criminal procedure in the military system, also prescribed by the
Military Justice Act, is almost identical to civilian criminal procedure. The
act itself, like much of Israel's civilian criminal law and procedure, is an imported
version of the equivalent British legislation, albeit heavily amended and
reformed. There are, however, some significant differences: prosecutorial
discretion in the army includes the option to indict the soldier in a smallscale "disciplinary hearing" before a lay commander, a process that is not
subjected to procedural or evidentiary rules, and that does not entail a
criminal record. Also, if a soldier is discharged from service, he or she
ceases to be subjected to military jurisdiction. These features make the
system slightly less residual than the civilian system, though the latter also
offers various extralegal mechanisms for diverting cases away from the
courts. It should also be mentioned that the system is of relatively small
size, comprised of eight jurisdictions across the country, and employing a
total of no more than two hundred officers (judges, prosecutors, and defense
attorneys). A typical career at the Military Justice system often involves
changing roles and locations every few years. These size and organization
features yield much familiarity between officers who are "repeat players"
and create close-knit courtroom communities (Nardulli 1978). While classic
courtroom ethnographies often had to be limited to one or two criminal
courtroom settings (Feeley 1979; Maynard 1984). this legal system can be
studied in its entirety, which makes it an ideal setting for a study focusing
on a variety of knowledge-production sites. 3
Acts of desertion and conscientious objection can be prosecuted as
military offenses: Unauthorized Absence from Service (article 94 of the
Military Justice Act, 1955) and Refusing to Obey an Order (article 102 of
the Military Justice Act). Both offenses, imported from British military
legislation, were designed for an imperial army fighting away from home.
In the Israeli context, however, they receive an entirely different meaning,
as legal mechanisms to conceptualize and repress acts of defiance that constitute
a challenge to the formative Israeli ethos of compulsory military service.
Ever since the inauguration of Israel as an independent state in 1948, military
service has not only been a duty based on the Security Service Act ( [combined
version], 1986), but also an important aspect of Israeli identity. In its early
years, military service was designed to be a "melting-pof' for the Israeli
multicultural society (Kimmerling 1971; Levy 2003). It is also credited for
supplying social legitimacy and material advantages (Barnett 1992): in public
debates, it is common to invoke one's military background as a justification
to present a knowledgeable opinion (Vald 1992; also see Chacham 2004).
However, the seemingly egalitarian model of military service has not remained
unchallenged; members of certain social groups are exempted from service.
a topic constantly under public debate (Margalit and Halbertal 1998). The
army's participation in ethically debated activities has produced waves of
resistance, particularly in the Lebanon war (Linn 1996a; Sheleff 1987) and
the 1988 Intifada (Kidron 2004: Linn 1996a). The inadequacies of the army
'0 2()IIX The Author
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as a "melting pot" have received somewhat less critical attention, but some
studies argue that the army does not ameliorate, but rather reproduces and
aggravates, social inequalities, through gender- and ethnicity-based discrimination (Kirnmerling 1971; Levy 2003; Smoocha 1984).
While the two study groups-deserters and conscientious objectorschallenge the military service ethos, they do so from very different places in
the Israeli social order. Conscientious objectors, described by themselves
and by others as members of the Israeli middle class, left-wing intelligentsia
(Chacham 2004; Linn 1996a, 1996b), choose to exit the military service
framework based on political dissent and opt to mobilize their political
views through alternative mechanisms: academic and public debate as well
as political activism. Deserters, on the other hand, represent the weakest
social groups in Israeli society; the offenders, often new immigrants or
working-class youngsters, often explain their absence from service as
stemming from economic difficulties in their families. The few military
studies on desertion confirm that the poor, the undereducated, and the
ethnically marginalized are significantly and strongly overrepresented in the
deserter population (Borkov 1992; Gahelet 2000; Rosenberg and Gorny
1965). Therefore, while the former group challenges national ethos based on
an ideological divide, the latter group "opts out" due to a socio-cultural
one. 4

IlL METHODOLOGY

The research was designed to identify the epistemological structure behind
the military justice system's perception and treatment of desertion and conscientious objection. Rather than explaining the difference in terms of legal
doctrine, social differences, or organizational features (such as, for example,
heavy caseloads), the goal was to examine how the legal system created
truth and utilized it in its policy toward desertion and conscientious
objection, and how much of this truth was the product of legal principles,
extralegal ways to frame the problems, or an assimilation of the latter into
the framework of the former. For this purpose, the study used a multimethod
design (Creswell 1994; Jupp 1989), observing four "sites" in the legal system:
the indictment stage, courtroom hearings, legal reasoning in verdicts, andfor deserters only-quantitative analysis of verdict outcomes. In each of
these sites, the findings were analyzed to answer the following questions:
How does the system perceive the problem? Which bodies of knowledge
shape this perception? How does the policy reflect these perceptions and
knowledge sources?
The indictment "site" focuses on prosecutorial decision making. It uses
military archival material and in-depth interviews with prosecutors to
explicate indictment policies through the ethos of compulsory and egalitarian
military service and its two corollaries: the ethical, defensive nature of the
© 2008 The Author
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army ('"it is ethical to serve") and its populist nature ('"everyone can serve").
This section compares the case-by-case, inquisitive, philosophical care in
which conscientious objectors' cases are examined and eliminated from the
system's docket. to the bureaucratic, arithmetic method in which desertion
cases are brought to court. This section also explains why the following
sections, which address later stages in the legal process, involve so many
desertion cases and so few conscientious objectors' cases. I see the difference
in numbers of cases in the postindictment stages not as a methodological
hurdle. but as a finding in itself. which stems as much from the prosecutorial
concern about the potential for political discourse in court as from its lack
of concern about challenges to the socio-economic structure.
The courtroom hearing "site" is based on an analysis of extensive courtroom observations of deserter and conscientious objector trials, conducted
almost daily in military courts between June and October of 2003. supplemented with in-depth interviews of prosecutors, defense attorneys, and
judges. The observations cover procedural practices as well as substantive
content and informal interactions within the courtroom, and seek to find a
connection between the respective "voices" of the two groups of offenders
and the amount of flexibility in form and content of the legal process.
The legal reasoning "'site" examines the legal system's most explicit discursive
product: the verdict. In my content analysis of eighty-five randomly selected
deserter verdicts and the two lengthy verdicts in the conscientious objectors'
cases,s I identify the realms of knowledge used by the judges to construct a
"'truth" about the problems and offenders it addressed. The analysis relied
on coded key phrases, narratives, redundancies, omissions. and value statements in order to produce a picture of legal thoughts on social problems
(Bogoch and Don- Yichya 1999); but beyond these indicators, it sought to
figure out the extent to which the social and political issues underlying the
problems \\ere allowed to enter the legal language and the ways in which
they were assimilated, modified, and reneated within it.
The fourth and final "site" examines the infiltration of knowledge about
desertion to the actual outcome of the case-the severity of the sentenceusing a linear regression model. Unfortunately. due to the screening processes
described in the first "site," this section only addresses desertion cases, whose
numbers allowed for large-scale quantitative analysis. The regression model
examined the correlations between the imprisonment sentence for deserters
and a set of fifty-five variables, \\hich were coded directly from 853 randomly
sampled military verdicts of deserters hied in the years 2000-200.2. The reason
for this source \\as that the model was meant to reflect not the "'reality" of
sentencing, but the patterns as the judges saw them. For the project's purposes,
the independent variables \\ere divided between three groups: doctrinal
\ ariables (length of absence. criminal record), system \'ariables (the identity
of the legal actors, plea bargains and defense tactics), and socio-economic
aspects pertaining to the offenders' particular problems. The model was
coded and run using the SPSS soft\\are package version 12.0, particularly
l
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the Stepwise regression option. Running recursive models has ~ever~l
methodological shortcomings; however, it proved a useful tool In thIs
particular section of the study, which followed a "ground theory" approach,
in the sense that no preliminary assumptions were made as to the prevalence
of legal or extralegal factors in the decision-making process.

IV. FINDINGS

A. HOW DISOBEDIENCE BECOMES A CRIMINAL CASE: A GENEALOGY OF
CRIMINALIZATION

Policy decisions addressing disobedience, including the prosecutorial
decision to indict. occur in an epistemological space. Any decision to prosecute
a deserter or a conscientious objector builds on a body of preconceived
knowledge: an understanding about the nature of the problem, the people
involved in it, and the way it should be addressed (Frohmann 1997). As
prosecutorial policies in desertion and conscientious objectors' cases show,
in both cases the decision to indict has to synthesize two contradictory
notions: the classicist, criminal law notion of individuals as autonomous
moral agents whose choice contradicts the monolithic public good and the
external narratives that suggest a more ambiguous picture. In both cases.
the external narratives are transformed into legal considerations, and, as
such, they influence the knowledge that surrounds the prosecutorial
decision.
The classicist view of disobedient people as criminals is constructed
through the formative ethos of compulsory and egalitarian military service.
The army's popular image is that of an institution of the Israeli people in
which everyone shares the duty and privilege to defend their nation against
its surrounding enemies (Almog 1997; Levy 2003). This ethos constructs
military service not only as a legal duty, but as one which embodies positive
social values. It is the legitimate. socially approved choice; dissent and
disobedience are criminalized. This duality rests on the premise that serving
in the army is not only mandatory, but also viable and possible under all
circumstances. According to the ethos, the army presents no ethical
challenges due to its defensive character, according to which it only engages
in ethical practices that are necessary for the country's survival (its very
name-Israel Defense Force-supports this narrative). An ethical army, by
definition. is never engaged in immoral missions, and therefore does not
present any moral dilemmas to its soldiers (Levy 2003; Pappe 1993).
Similarly, military service is never placed in conflict with familial obligations
or socio-economic necessities; in an egalitarian "army of the people," the
military welfare authorities make sure that every soldier in need receives
support and financial aid. which assure that everyone not only has to serve,
but is able to do so. The corollary of these formative ideas is that anyone
© 2008 The Author
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who opts out of military service, by suggesting that this legal duty conflicts
with his or her conscience or necessities, is consciously making the wrong
(albeit free) choice and is therefore fully accountable for his or her actions.
The monolithic narrative leaves no room for questioning the moral rightness
of military activities or the conflict between service and familial or financial
necessi ties.
External considerations, however, do knock on the door. In the conscientious objectors' cases, they are presented as alternative readings of the
political situation: the offenders argue that participating in military activities
means committing immoral acts. The law is not deaf to the problematic and
challenging nature of this argument; however, due to the classicist premise
of monolithic "good" and free choice, it cannot accept it as face value. Instead,
it transforms the moral argument into a model of personal difficulty. Since
the army's activities in the territories are ethicaL the objectors are, naturally,
"wrong" in their refusal to serve. However, the army is prepared to make
certain concessions to them, which do not stem from ethical uncertainty,
but rather from a bona fide attempt to accommodate their (misguided)
consciences. The official policy in conscientious objector cases has been
based on a distinction between pacifists ("full objectors"), who are exempted
from service on a case-by-case basis, and people whose objection stems
from political dissent ("selective objectors") who are criminalized. Personnel
documents from the early 2000s include lists of hundreds of high school
seniors (potential regular service soldiers) who signed petitions against the
occupation. For each of these cases, the list specifies the potential fate of
the case: whether the objector appeared to be a pacifist or a political dissenter;
whether the objector's parents could be used to convince them to serve; and
whether they had a personal history of mental problems or narcotics that
could lead to their quiet dismissal from service for other reasons. Objectors
that insisted not to serve were awarded a lengthy hearing at the military
"conscience committee," formed in 1995. The committee was comprised of
officers from the personnel units, a legal officer, and (since 2002) a volunteer
professor of philosophy. This peculiar choice indicates the realm of knowledge
that the committee relied on: it was not preoccupied with the objectors'
honesty, but rather with their philosophical viewpoints. Co-opting and
modifying the Rawlsian concepts of conscientious objection and civil
disobedience, the committee interrogated objectors, their lawyers, and witnesses about the grounds for their refusal to serve, attempting to convince
them of their mistake. In the early 2000s, the escalation of the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict led to the emergence of a new "objection frontier" (Leibovitz-Dar
2000), comprised of reservists and high school students. This eruption of
dissent yielded a military policy according to which objectors were not
indicted, but rather tried in disciplinary hearings and sentenced to short
prison terms. During their incarceration, the objectors received various
offers to serve under special terms (such as service at a hospital with no
uniform, no weapons, and no basic training). Only if they declined these
'\ cIJ08 The Author
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offers to ""end the matter quietly," and continued refusing to serve, they
would be prosecuted. These diversionary techniques led to the fact that
only two cases, featuring six regular service soldiers, eventually reached the
military courts. These two cases, the Yoni Ben Artzi case (Headquarters
129/03) and the five political objectors' case (Headquarters 151, 174, 205,
222, 243/03), are analyzed at length in this project.
In desertion cases, external considerations knock on the door in the form
of the deserter population's problematic demographics. The prosecutors I
interviewed, who indicted deserters, encountered dozens of cases every day,
in which, invariably, the defendants explained their absence in terms of
socio-economic hardships and family emergencies. Moreover, the prosecutors
were aware that desertion had "a lot to do" with socio-economic hardships
and were familiar with some of the military studies that suggested this link.
Nevertheless, in the interviews, the prosecutors maintained that financial
and familial misfortunes did not eliminate the choice to serve despite one's
problems ("All in all it's a question of values. I can tell you that, no matter
what my circumstances were, I would never desert" (Interview #1). Most
of them expressed faith in the army's welfare mechanisms as a means to
financially provide for soldiers, even though none of them knew the particular
amounts and conditions ("I'm assuming the army gives people everything
they need" (Interview #38». However, the classicistic image of deserters as
autonomous agents clashed with the large, and growing, numbers of cases
in which defendants framed their actions in the context of external difficulties.
Like in the conscientious objectors' cases, here, too, legal policy found a
way to incorporate and encapsulate these contradictory notions in a way
that did not challenge the monolithic ethos of military service.
The threat of deserters was constructed by prosecutors and policymakers
as lying not in the individual case, but in the bulk of cases as a whole.
Prosecutors were quick to note that desertion accounted for more than 50
percent of the military courts' workload (a fact confirmed by the unit's yearly
activity reports (Military Advocate General Corps Activity Reports 2001,
2002», which, to them, indicated the difficulties faced by military unit commanders who contacted them and voiced their concerns about the growth
of the phenomenon ("They keep telling us to increase punishment, because
they don't understand" (Interview #35». They also mentioned their frustration
with allocating a large percentage of their workday for handling these cases,
which offered them no professional challenge or interest and diverted their
energy away from more complex legal cases ("When I have a sexual abuse
case I want to put in days and nights, whereas with these cases ... there's
no comparison at all" (Interview #4».
The prosecutorial understanding of desertion as a "bulk threat" yielded
a highly formalized, bureaucratized prosecutorial response mechanism.
A specialized unit, the Desertion and Unauthorized Absence Prosecution,
manufactured identical indictments by the dozen on an average day, basing
their decision almost exclusively on one parameter: the length of absence
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from service. This easy-to-apply standard, incorporated into Military
Prosecution Instruction 2.04, was perceived to provide a measurable indicator
for the severity of the offense. 6 According to prosecutorial guidelines.
deserters whose absences exceeded forty-five days were to be tried in court;
shorter absences (about 70 percent of the cases) were handled through
disciplinary procedures in the unit or in military prisons. With the escalation
of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in 2000, desertion rates rose, a phenomenon
linked by the media with the economic crisis prompted by the escalation
(Glickman 2003; Harel 2002; Rabin 2002). This led to more lax policies,
which informally raised the minimum absence period for indictment to sixty
days. Desertion prosecutors repeatedly referred to their job as a "technical"
one, and to desertion files as "repetitive" and "boring":
Sometimes I get here and feel like I'm a machine, like when there's a [military
police arrest) operation ... I take a pile of cases and just process humongous
amounts, like sixty cases a day. I can do a case in a minute, half a minute, and
then you can't really go into their personal circumstances .. after three years
here my brain has gone into entropy and I can read the cases upside down.
(Interview #29)

Several things should be noted. First, at the base of each prosecutorial decision are classicistic constructions of disobedience as a matter of personal and
misguided choice, setting aside pluralistic considerations of alternative
moralities or social inequalities. Second, in both cases, the pluralistic
considerations are reinterpreted and included in the indictment policy.
However, while both problems represent threats to different aspects of the
same ethos, the nature of this threat is different. The potential threat of
conscientious objectors is rooted in their individual moral and intellectual
resources. The army's unwillingness to engage in philosophical debate
within the legal arena propels it to make substantial efforts to resolve
conflicts in an informal, individualized, quiet manner. The potential threat
of deserters-seen as a disempowered, silent minority with socio-economic
difficulties-lies not in their individual arguments, but in the argument
emerging from their large and increasing numbers, which problematizes the
ethos of a "people's army." The army's unwillingness to ask questions
about the nature of compulsory service leads it to a bureaucratized policy
of prosecuting by numbers (Sudnow 1965), while preserving the rhetoric of
personal choice for cases which reach the court.
B HOW DISOBEDIENCE IS DISCUSSED IN COURT: flEXIBILITY,
CONTENT, AND VOICE OF THE OFFENDERS IN HEARINGS

Observing the legal proceedings in deserters' and conscientious objectors'
cases revealed an adherence to the classicist narrative of choice in both
cases, while introducing the extralegal issues (political dissent for objectors,
social inequalities for deserters) in predefined, limited places within the
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process. There was, however, a difference in the extent to which the legal
arena was willing to accommodate these external considerations. Conscientious
objectors' trials were much more flexible in form, and allowed for the inclusion
of more diverse content into the legal framework; this was, to a great
extent, owed to the salience and voice of the offenders within the process.
Deserter trials, on the other hand, were characterized by strict adherence to
a routine format, constrained content defined almost exclusively by formal
legal requirements, and a weak, mediated voice of the offenders.
Deserters were often tried in court in batches of ten to twenty cases per
morning, before a single judge. The trial style was defined by the actors as
an "assembly line." Trials with plea bargains were remarkably similar to
trials with open sentencing (the latter were slightly slower: see Nardulli
1978); negotiation between the parties, though informal (Maynard 1984),
did not change the nature of courtroom dynamics. The prosecution presented
documentation relating to the absence; the defense presented welfare,
medical andlor mental health documentation, and occasionally produced
testimonies from the defendants or their family members telling of the situation
at home, who were cross-examined by the prosecution in a more-or-less
uniform fashion. One of my interviewees, a young prosecutor, handed me a
ready-made printed form with cross-examination questions for defendants,
which she had created and distributed among all deserter prosecutors in the
district (Interview #19).
The judge remained relatively passive, stopping the stream of cases only
when something hindered the smooth progress of the day, such as a Russianspeaking defendant who required a translator. A middle-class witness, such
as an employer or a former commander taking interest in the defendant and
coming to testify, was considered a rare event. and in the one instance it
occurred, the witness was treated with great respect and interest. One of the
prosecutors commented: "It's real rare that commanders show up ... I
mean, they don't have time, but also, you know, it's not very likely that
deserters will ever go back to the unit, right?" (Interview #18). Order and
quiet in the courtroom were strictly maintained, and verdicts were read to
the defendants in formal language, sometimes followed by a quasi-parental
"word of advice' from the judge warning them not to commit future
absences ("Next time I won't be so lenient with you. I hope we won't see
you here again. ,. Field notes from courtroom observations, 22 September).
By contrast, the court was extremely flexible in procedural requirements
in conscientious ohjectors' trials. In one of its decisions about allowing
certain testimony, it even stated explicitly that it intended to provide th~
objectors with every possible means to present their perspectives. Thus, the
trials included lengthy testimonies; in one of them, the five defendants were
allowed to present their world views one after the other before any of them
was cross-examined. In the other trial, high-ranked military offl~ials were
summoned as defense hostile witnesses and cross-examined for hours. The
court exhibited remarkable tolerance to the appearance and behavior of the
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defendants and their supporters: the defendants were allowed to appear in
civilian clothes, political side remarks from the audience were ignored or
addressed forgivingly, and the court even agreed to negotiate its recess
policy with a defendant's mother who rose from the audience (''I'm the
mother of one of the defendants, and we have many supporters outside
who want to come in, and it's really crowded here. If we had a break, we
could have a 'changing of the guard' " "Okay, ma'am, we'll keep going
for about fifteen minutes and then we'll take a break." Field notes from
courtroom observations. 18 September).
The difference between the trial styles was even more evident in the
content of the hearings. Deserter cases, always following a guilty plea, seldom
strayed from the routine narrative based on the "ends of punishment"deterrence, retribution, and a narrow interpretation of rehabilitation as the
likelihood that the offender would return to normative service. The default
assumption was that the offender was an autonomous. free-willed being
(Hudson 1987, 1993) who chose his or her personal welfare above the service
duty. While prosecutorial cross-examination questions repetitively prodded
in this direction by suggesting the legitimate paths available to the defendant
("Why didn't you talk to your commander? Why didn't you wait to hear
from welfare? Why don't your brothers help at home?"), the defense line
did not question the prevalence of military over personal obligations but
made use of a discourse of mercy and quasi-therapeutic language to diminish
the range of choice available to the defendant. As one of the interviewees. a
veteran defense attorney, explained. "The defense attorney's work basically
consists of painting a picture of great misery" (Interview #36). The defendant's
socio-economic background was never discussed as a general feature of
desertion cases, but only as the specific offender's personal mitigating
circumstances.
The content of conscientious objector trials was much more colorful and
diverse. The court, partly in response to issues brought up by the prosecution
and the defense, allowed extensive discussion of issues that, from a narrow
perspective, would be deemed irrelevant: the defendants' personal histories
and world views-an "etiology of ideology" of sorts. The court and the parties
encouraged the defendants and witnesses to elaborate not only on their
childhood formative experiences (Ben Artzi's sister was asked to relay
stories from her brother's antics and protests in junior high schooll. but
on their perspectives about the general questions brought up: what counted
as a pacifist world view (in the Ben Artzi case) and what constituted, or
should have constituted, an issue of conscience (in the five objectors' case).
These were not external questions garnishing the legal discussion: the
court's substantive agenda was organized around them. The court also
enabled the defense to criticize military authorities, such as drafting officers
and the conscience committee.
The difference in procedure and content was largely due to the different
roles played by the defendants in the two types of cases. While deserters
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were brought to trial from detention cells, wearing prison uniforms, cuffed
in their hands and feet, and under heavy military police escort, objectors
appeared in civilian clothes, entering the courtroom to an applause from
the large audience, comprised of their unmistakably middle-class families
and political supporters. Deserters were hardly heard in court; their voices
were heavily mediated by their defense attorneys, who feared they would
damage themselves in self-testimony. One of the interviewees, in a selfreflective moment, commented: "The problem is we're making the judge's
job easier. It's much more convenient for the judge to hear the reality in
dolled-up legalese from the defense attorney who says 'difficult economic
situation.' Who knows what would happen if we had them tell the story in
their own words?" (Interview #12). When the defendants did speak, it was
mostly to ask for mercy before the verdict, and they were often shy and
hindered by language and articulation barriers.
Conscientious objectors, on the other hand, testified at length, clearly and
articulately, did not hesitate to rephrase questions posed to them in crossexamination, and often glanced at the court typist's official monitor, to see
whether they were quoted correctly.
What led to the creation of such polar models, resembling a bureaucratic
assembly line in one type of cases and an epistemological discussion in the
other?7 Beyond the difference in numbers of cases, which probably led to a
trivialization and routinization of the deserters' cases (Eisenstein and Jacob
1977; Sudnow 1965), the two genres seem to follow two very different agendas,
which dictate the system's cognitive openness to encompass philosophical
issues and personal "etiology of ideology" as essential information to shape
its knowledge in one case and its closure to any issue beyond the formalities
of caseload management in the other.
In the deserter cases, the institutional agenda is oriented inward, into the
military courtroom workgroup itself. Through its procedural rules, choices
of content, allocation of voices, and power in the process, the system strives
to perpetuate itself and its policy respecting desertion. The focus seems to
be, in the short run, to facilitate the smooth flow of the workday, to deal
with exceptions in a way that reinforces the rules, and to minimize conflict;
in the long run, the system wishes to maintain precedents as simple guidelines,
to allow for equally smooth workdays in the future. The autopoietic nature
of deserter case management is, therefore, technical and endogenous, and
does not require any openness to alternative realms of knowledge.
By contrast, the agenda in conscientious objector cases is externally
oriented and includes a more complex twofold message: On the epistemological leveL the content and form produced in the courtroom are designed
to reinforce the consensual idea according to which the objectors are morally,
legally, and politically wrong or misguided. s On the procedural leveL the
court projects the idea of extreme judicial fairness. In order to avoid potential
undermining of its legitimate foundation, the court wishes to present itself
as providing the objectors with every possible opportunity of proving themselves
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right and allows itself to compromise form and content for this purpose.
These two seemingly contradictory messages are, in fact, two sides of the
same coin: the military position on the conscientious objection question can
be shown to be legitimate only through extremely fair processes. thus
making the discussion apolitical and fair. The outward-bound nature of this
agenda requires the court to expand its cognitive openness and to allow
at least for external terminology to inform it about the problem. while
maintaining ultimate control (and normative closure) about the manner in
which this terminology is assimilated into the legal process and applied to
the case.
C. HOW DISOBEDIENCE IS CONSTRUCTED IN LEGAL REASONING:
PROBLEM PERCEPTIONS AND REALMS OF KNOWLEDGE IN COURT
VERDICTS

The dialogue between legal reasoning and extralegal perceptions of the
problems is showcased in the court's most basic legal communication: its
final product. the verdict. In verdicts of both deserters and conscientious
objectors, not only did the court present its perspectives on the problem,
the subjects, and the suitable strategies and technologies for its solution, but
in addition it disclosed important underlying information: the disciplines
and realms of knowledge it utilized to shape its perspective on the problem.
Desertion was seen, first and foremost, as a criminal offense. The verdict's
narrative invariably began by stating the length of absence and other information pertinent to the offense, and supplied the offender's motive for the
offense (often economic or medical hardships in the family. which preceded
the offense) later, in a fragmented, nonchronological manner. The style of
these descriptions often foreshadowed the severity of the verdict. The court
constructed the defendants into two categories: "the rule"-free-willed
individuals who had made a selfish choice to absent themselves from the
army-and "the exception"-people who encountered hardships or suffered
from serious personal adjustment problems that make them somewhat less
blameworthy. The first group was characterized by expressions such as
"chose," "took the law into his own hands," and "forced his will on the
army," conveying a message of manipulation and selfishness:
I have weighed the matter of the defendant. My impression is that his main
difficulties are not in the economic level, but in his will to exit the unit in which
he serves. The defendant actually did not take any legal measures to try and
solve his problems and chose a path of absence from service. (North 316/00: 1)

The second group's circumstances were described more sympathetically,
using words such as "distress," "harsh circumstances," "disability," "unfitness,"
and "had to desert." These soldiers were not exempted from responsibility,
but the individualization of their circumstances as exceptional allowed the
court to use a less harsh tone:
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The only question I am facing is whether to impose an imprisonment sentence
on the defendant. My answer to this question is that since the defendant has
been dismissed from service based on a mental health profile there is no room
to impose an imprisonment sentence on him ... it would be better if the
military authorities would identify the disabilities of soldiers of his kind even
before the draft so that the soldier would not have been drafted to service at
all, because he is not fit for service in his condition. (North 457/00: I)

Through these two categories, the court made a narrow "window" for
introducing extralegal considerations. The categories allowed the court to
make sense of the deserters: they were either "manipulators," autonomous
agents in defiance of the rule of law, or "victims' of particularly difficult
circumstances. By reducing the issue of social inequality to individualized
mitigating circumstances, the court allowed some discussion of the underlying
issues, while limiting the potential for generalization and problematization.
The two conscientious objector verdicts were far more lengthy and
detailed. In them, conscientious objection was portrayed as dangerous
behavior, whose harm stemmed from the individualism, candidness, and
self-conviction of the intelligent, articulate defendants. Any tolerance for
objection was perceived as a risk of politicizing the army, dividing the
population within the army, persuading others with subversive rhetoric, and
snubbing common sense by assuming that everyone else is mistaken. The
questions that interested the court were a compromise between the
pertinent legal question of guilt and the epistemological issues brought up
by the defendants and their attorneys (Khanin, Sfard and Rotbard 2004). In
the Ben Artzi trial. the court was interested in the power and authority of an
external body (the conscience committee) to define pacifist beliefs. and in "the
five" trial, the court was interested in the conceptual meaning of conscience
and whether it could be broadened to include political considerations.
These expanded interests led the court to an interesting, and uneasy, dialogue
between law and political philosophy. While the court bOlTowed philosophical
terms from the Rawlsian theoretical realm, it merely used them as labels for
its own classifications. In the Ben Artzi case, the traditional legal distinction
between "absolute" pacifism and "selective' refusal on political grounds
was reinforced partly because of its supposedly easy application. In the five
objectors' case, the court made a distinction between "conscientious objection,"
which it defined as refusal based on the need to personally dissociate oneself
from actions perceived as immoral, and "civil disobedience:' defined as a
refusal aimed at convincing others in the wrongness of the disputed law. 9
Other realms of knowledge received even lesser respect; when the defense in
the five objectors' trial wished to dispute the (empirical) claim that
acknowledging conscientious objection might be extensively misused, the
court replied, in a classical autopoietic argument, that it had all the knowledae
b
it needed to evaluate risk-in Supreme Court precedents:
We are speaking of matters that are known to everyone, thinQs that were
claimed again and again in front of the different courts, and adopted by them.
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Indeed, the Supreme Court, sitting as High Court of Justice, stated the main
part of these doubts and dangers, and adopted them as a cause and a reason
to avoid assisting the petitioners, who had addressed it asking to legally
recognize their refusal to perform military service. (Headquarters 151. 174,
205, 222. 243/03: 7)

As with deserters, the court was obsessed with classifying, simplifying, and
understanding the objectors: it ventured to the defendants' personal
histories in order to extract the "dominant" motive for their actions:
We found that we are close to the opinion ... according to which, although the
possibility of duality in motives is possible, it is, in general, a theoretical and
distant possibility. We thought that the main motive hiding behind the actions
of the defendants before us, considering the totality of circumstances surrounding
their actions, is the will to cause a political change, that is, to bring about a
change in public opinion and the governmental policy. We doubt whether the
conscientious motive, in itself, is enough to be a basis to the defendants'
refusal, based on the totality of the things they said. Yet, we are ready to avoid
stating unambiguously, that the civil disobedience motive is the only one
moving the defendants, and to assume, that it is also a motive of conscientious
objection which moves them, perhaps even as a sufficient motive, to commit
the act of refusal. (Headquarters 151, 174, 205, 222, 243/03: 75; emphasis in
original)

In the Ben Artzi case, while the court was unable to comfortably pigeonhole
the defendant's beliefs as either pacifistic or political/subversive, it sought to
unify and harmonize them:
Is the inability to adjust to the military framework a consequence of the pacifist
belief, or perhaps the pacifist belief is the cause [sic-probably meant "result"]
of the inability to adjust to, or to accept, the existence of a military framework,
whose goals are defined the way they are defined, and whose means are the way
they are?! (Headquarters 129/03: 23)
The defendant distinguished ... between the pacifist belief and the political
view (though it is clear that a pacifistic view will be difficult to reconcile with
a different political view). (ibid.: 32, 33)

The tendency to reduce and simplify human complexities for the sake of
legal decision was evident in deserters' and in conscientious objectors' cases.
In both cases, when seeking an "understanding" of the defendants, the
court opted for individualization rather than for an open discussion of the
general extralegal arguments underlying the issues. However, there were
differences in the content of the classifications. With deserters, the court
looked more favorably upon helpless, weak defendants, who were more
victims of their circumstances than selfish manipulators. With conscientious
objectors, the court sought articulate individuals, whose well-defined ideology
was isolated and manageable. Though the objectors were given much more
respect and voice than the deserters, and though conscientious objectors'
verdicts were more cognitively open to assimilate "external" content, pertaining
to the extralegal, political framing of the problem, in both cases legal
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reasoning remained, eventually, normatively closed to different perspectives
on the issues themselves.
D. HOW DISOBEDIENCE IS MEASURED: A QUANTITATIVE EXAMINATION
OF SENTENCES FOR DESERTION

Finally. the study examined the interplay of legal and extralegal factors in
a non textual "site"-the sentence. As explained above. due to the small
number of conscientious objectors who reached the trial stage, this section
of the study refers to deserters alone.
The main finding from the model was that, contrary to several assumptions
highlighted in realist socio-Iegal research. and consistent with other large-scale
sentencing quantitative studies (Flemming. Nardulli and Eisenstein 1992), the
criminal sentence was, first and foremost, a function of traditional, doctrinally
defined factors. The strongest and most significant explanatory variable
was, by far. the length of absence from service, which. as mentioned above,
was regarded by all actors in the system as the most accurate indicator of
the severity of the otTense. The strong correlation between length of absence
and length of prison sentence was evident in linear, logarithmic, and cluster
bivariate regressions, and particularly salient for absences not exceeding
one year (see Figure 1).10
Subsequently, a multivariate regression was run,ll resulting in an explanatory
model that predicted punishment for deserters as a function of the twelve
significant varialbles. Bivariate analysis for each variable was also conducted.
Table 1 showcases the significant variables,12 classifying them according to
their nature: variables corresponding to a doctrinaL "law in the books"
approach (severity of the offense, criminal record); trial-related variables
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Figure 1. Imprisonment as a Function of Length of Absence, for Absences Not
Exceeding One Year: Linear and Logarithmic Regressions.
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Table 1. A Classification of Significant Variables, According to the Theoretical
Framework They Support and Their Bivariate Regression R-Square Values
Doctrinal
Variables
Strong
Explanatory
Power (R Square >=0.2)

Length of Absence
Previous
Suspended Sentence

Medium
Explanatory Power
(1 =< R square < 0.2)

Previous Absences

Weak Explanatory
Power
(R Square < 0.1)

Trial-Related
Variables

Defendant-Related
Variables

Number of Judges

Current Service Status
Alcohol/Drug issues

Reserve
Defense Attorney

Health Problems
Service Conditions
JewishINon-Jewish
Assistance from Unit
Parental Marital Status

(court and lawyers); and defendant-related variables (the defendant's
circumstances as described by the court).
As the table shows, the court's sentencing policy corresponded most strongly
with the doctrinal variables-length of absence, used as an index of severity,
and criminal record-and was considerably less influenced by extralegal
factors, system- or offender-related. The third and fourth strongest variables
in the regression-service status at the time of trial and involvement in
alcohol/narcotics-suggest that the court treated more leniently soldiers
who, due to their circumstances, were either out of the system, or on their
way out of it. According to the Personnel Unit's Standing Instruction k-3001-07, drug and/or alcohol abuse are almost automatic grounds for discharge;
therefore, soldiers with such problems would naturally leave the army and
consequently not repeat the offenses, thus rendering a deterrent sentence
unnecessary.13 The remaining significant variables had a very small effect on
the model. Socio-economic economic factors, which were often mentioned
by the judges as mitigating circumstances, were almost completely absent from
the model, except for three variables, and even those reflected hidden social
prejudices more than they reflected genuine consideration of the circumstances. 14 As to trial-related variables, the model revealed that defense strategies,
such as plea bargaining, did not make much difference. The two other variables
concerning trial circumstances-number of judges and representation by reserve
service attorneys-have rather mundane, bureaucratic explanations. 15

V. DISCUSSION: HOW DISOBEDIENCE IS JURIDIFIED

The main common finding from the four "sites" is a reinforced acknowledgment of the power of law to dominate and produce knowledge. including
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the "translation" and adaptation of extralegal knowledge into its own logic
and vocabulary. In its process of understanding and addressing disobedience,
law came in direct conflict with alternative narratives. In the conscientious
objectors' cases, the legal monolithic definition of ethical behavior-compliance
and military service-is directly challenged by individuals who argue for a
different perspective on the morality of the situation, in which their conscience
requires them not to serve. In desertion cases, the resistance to the monolithic
definition of legal behavior is much less vocal; by preferring to work or help
their families, deserters challenge the notion that military service is a viable
option for them and challenge the assumption of equality underlying the
duty to serve. In both cases, the challenges say something not only about
the rule of law, but also about legal knowledge; they introduce alternative
frameworks that illuminate the problems from a different perspective. Law
does not operate in ignorance of these challenges; nor does it engage in
direct dialogue with the competing discourses. What it does is introduce
concepts and fragments from the challenging realms into the legal decisionmaking process, in a way that enhances, but does not hinder or modify, the
main premises of the criminal justice process. In both cases, the external
narratives are reduced into Weberian "ideal types"-mutually exclusive
categories that, in their turn, help the legal system classify the cases at hand
and make sense of them. While this modern, rational method is not endemic
to law, it is certainly used by law to a great extent (law is, in this respect, an
important defining phenomenon of modernity (Trubek 1986; Weber and
Eisenstadt 1968)). In the cases of both deserters and conscientious objectors,
the process and its content, though cognitively open to influences of external
disciplines, was eventually dominated by legal rationality, which was the
definitive factor in reaching the outcomes. This prevalence of law illustrates
and verifies the autopoietic concept of law as a self-referential system,
which is normatively closed despite being cognitively open (Teubner 1989).
Legal vocabulary had an interesting interaction with the external realms
of knowledge that it encountered when addressing the two problems, particularly conscientious objection. Concepts from political philosophy enriched
and informed the legal discussion of the problem, but its actual usage during
trial and in the verdict did not resemble its original form. The law recreated
and constructed philosophical categories to the advantage of its classification
system, by using concepts assimilated from philosophy as headlines for the
rational-legal categories into which it classified the defendants. This enabled
the court to maintain the dual character of its function: making decisions
based on its own doctrinal premises, while simultaneously obtaining external
validation and legitimacy to a controversial decision through the disciplinary
framework advocated by the defendants and their supporters, who would
potentially undermine the court's legitimacy to try and convict them for
their moral and political beliefs (Fish 1991).
It is equally evident, though, that law's dialogue with the external knowledge
frameworks was different in the two problems studied. For conscientious
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objectors, the law's prevalence was manifested in the bottom-line outcome
of the trials (a conviction and a prison sentence), but the legal discussion
provided the defendants with some important advantages. Introducing
language from political philosophy into the legal arena and delving into
epistemological examinations of ideology entitled the defendants to an
extensive voice throughout the process, which legitimized framing the issue
of objection as a matter for political and public debate. For this reason, it
is difficult to say whether the conscientious objectors' brush with the law
resulted in victory or failure; the full implications of the trials may include
their spillover into public debate, which have benefited the movement in the
arenas more important to them and to their struggle. 16
The picture was significantly different for deserters. In the absence of
resources for presenting an articulate voice framing their problem in generic
terms (such as economic inequalities or cultural insensitivities), and facilitated by the large numbers of cases, the problem of desertion was addressed
through a default model creating a highly formalized, bureaucratic strategy
for trying and sentencing them. The power of precedents and existing practices enabled the court to create a simplified technical "how-to" method.
which not only facilitated the smooth flow of routine cases during the
workday, but also created a self-perpetuating momentum, which led all
actors-even defense attorneys-to conform to its rigid guidelines. This
effect oflegal formality goes beyond the mere premise of "underclass oppression"
suggested by socio-Iegal realism. Such a notion would explain why the
defense fails to protect the interests of deserters, but not why it fails to try
and do so. Acknowledging the power of legal indoctrination as a selfperpetuating mechanism provides a fuller account of how the policy regarding
deserters came to be.
How, then, do power and resources, extralegal variables, affect the legal
process? These social factors lead an interesting dialogue with the legal
discourse. While formality prevails for both groups of offenders. vocal and
voiceless alike, the conscientious objectors at least enjoy the possibility to
introduce their outlook on the problem as a source of knowledge into the legal
realm. They have the advantage of the system's cognitive openness to their own
perspective. Even if this advantage does not directly translate into acquittals
and lenient sentences (normatively favorable outcomes), at least it makes the
problem salient and interesting enough for the law to give it extensive
attention and to talk about it partly on the offenders' terms. This attention
in itself is a resource unavailable to the masses of forgotten, routine. deserter
cases who fail to present alternative frameworks to the prevalent formality.

VI. CONCLUSIONS

How much can we generalize from the case study? It is possible that other
groups of offenders, more and less powerful, engage in different types of
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dialogue with the law and with different degrees of success. The case study
is problematic in that it does not allow isolating the factor that most
facilitated the ditTerence between the problems, which could be the difference
in numbers, in resources, in ideology, or in the Israeli tendency to prioritize
political issues over socio-economic ones. It may be that law becomes more
autopoietic when it has more previous sources to rely on and refer to, as in
the case of deserters. It is not even clear whether isolating these factors
from each other is possible, since these factors are closely related to each
other. Be this as it may, the outcome is that the law, which still dominates
the discussion, is prepared to make more extensive cognitive allowances for
one group than for the other. Future research on different case studies
might be helpful in further examining this correlation.
Finally, the case study shows how approaches based on a critical observation
of law itself can bridge and inform formalist and realist perspectives on law.
The case study shows that both aspects are significant in determining legal
thought and policy. While not discounting the importance of power and
social structure, careful attention to legal formality allows for understanding
the thought process through which power is "converted" into legal currency
by the inner workings of the legal system, a mechanism that merits further
academic attention.

is Associate Professor at UC Hastings College olthe Law. Her research
interests include sociology of law. criminology and criminal justice. and social movements.

HADAR AVIRAM

NOTES

1. Several authors have offered ways to synthesize the various discursive analytical
frameworks without oversimplification: such an important task merits its own
discussion and exceeds the limits of this article (for insightful theoretical analysis
of these perspectives, see Andersen 2003; Banakar 2003; Cotterell 1995).
2. It should be mentioned that the military justice system described in this article is
an entirely different system from the military courts in the occupied territories,
which were the subject of Lisa Hajjar's recent book (Hajjar 2005). Whether one
agrees with Hajjar's analysis or not, and despite the significant legal and political
changes that took place since her data collection (Benisho 2005), the legal system
in the occupied territories is a forum where military members of one political
entity try, convict and punish people of a different ethnicity, fighting for
independence. This can hardly be compared to an internal military system which
deals with Israeli soldiers.
3. My access to the field was facilitated by the fact that my own military service,
between 1996 and 2000, was performed in the military justice system; I was thus
familiar with the different units, processes, and vernacular, and even maintained
a few personal connections, though most of the junior personnel had changed.
4. It IS probably due to these dIfferences between the two groups that they have not
been previously discussed together in academia. Naturally, conscientious
objection tends to draw much more scholarly attention, particularly in the fields
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of legal doctrine and political philosophy. Notwithstanding the interesting
features of the political and philosophical discussion of this problem, its intricate
details and insights are largely irrelevant for the purpose of this study, though
the fact that conscientious objection managed to raise considerable interest, while
desertion failed to do so, is a finding in itself.
5. The choice to select eighty-five cases of deserters stems from the fact that these
verdicts tend to be very short and formatted (averaging two to three pages of
text). as opposed to the conscientious objectors' verdicts, which were extremely
lengthy and elaborate (seventy to one hundred pages). As I discuss above, the
different prosecutorial decision-making processes. and the ideas that shape them.
make for many desertion indictments and very few conscientious objection
indictments; this, as explained above, is a finding rather than a methodological
problem. However, I felt that a textual comparison would be more complete if
similar amounts of text were analyzed for both problems, and therefore chose a
number of deserter cases that was methodologically manageable and yielded
about the same amount of text. Since patterns tended to repeat themselves, and
emerged from careful reading, I did not engage in rigorous counting of textual
expressions.
6. In at least 50% of the cases, indictment followed an arrest by the military police;
naturally, in these cases, the "length of absence" was defined by the arbitrary
date of apprehension and therefore could not really indicate much about the
severity of the deserter's act.
7. The models can be easily mapped onto Packer's models of crime control and due
process oriented systems (Packer 1968). However, rather than reflecting two
different systems, they appear side by side in the same system, for handling
offenses which violate the same values.
8. This would not necessarily entail vocal support of the occupation in the territories:
the message is subtler and has more to do with presenting the army as an
apolitical body who follows legal, and ethically sound. governmental orders.
9. The original meaning of the categories in Rawlsian theory is substantially modified in their translation to "legalspeak"; not only are the categories redefined,
but they are made to be mutually exclusive, to allow for classification, a feature their
original meanings did not possess (Rawls 1999).
10. Absences ranged between I and 2,690 days, with a mean of 131 and a median of
71. Standard deviation was 227.9. The pattern indicates a large number of
relatively short offenses, and a small percentage of long offenses, sometimes two
years or more. For all observations, linear regression yielded an R square of 0.18,
compared to 0.28 in logarithmic regression; for absences of a year or less, R
square was 0.28 for linear regression and 0.23 for logarithmic regression.
II. Since missing observations appeared in different categories for each case, I opted
to fill the blanks with the variable mean rather than excluding all cases with a
missing value from the model, which would lead to a very small number of
observations. This was a possible course of action because there was no reason
to assume that the observations with missing values differed from others
(Pindyck & Rubinfeld 1991).
12. Two variables that appeared as significant in the original stepwise model were
removed from this model: economic difficulties (R square = 0.137, b = 6.4) and
escaping confinement (R square = -12.4, b = -8.3). The coefficient sign suggested
that defendants whose economic difficulties were mentioned in the verdict got
harsher punishment. This seemed to be rather illogical (even through a radical
perspective!). and this result is therefore attributed to possible multicolinearity
between this variable and the plea-bargain variable: naturally, for people who
bargained for a set punishment, less data were included in the verdict, including
data about economic situation.
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In addition, the model suggested that defendants who escaped confinemen~ got
harsher punishments than those who did not; this also co~ld n~t be ~xplallled,
except perhaps by referring to the small number of cases III whIch thIS was the
case and was therefore also excluded from the model.
One'interesting ramification of this phenomenon is the creation of see,?i~gly
wrong incentives for offenders. Repeated desertions, as well as drug conVIctIOns
and other types of troublemaking, are grounds for discharge. It follows, therefore,
that a recidivist deserter is twice rewarded for repeated offending: firstly, by
managing to exit the army and secondly, by receiving a lenient imprisonment
sentence. This inverted economic rationale suggests, again, that the court's
commitment to values of deterrence and retribution is mostly rhetorical.
The defendant's Jewishness was a mitigating factor, which was a discouraging
finding; the bivariate table. however, reveals that it had a very small, albeit
statistically significant, impact on the model as a whole.
Cases tried before three judges yield harsher punishments than cases tried before
a single judge, because military law limits the single judge's sentencing authority
to one year. When the prosecution wishes to ask for a longer sentence, it asks for
the case to be tried before three judges. The fact that these cases eventually do
yield harsher punishments means that either the prosecution predicts well which
cases are more severe, or the judges act by a self-fulfilled prophecy and treat the
cases assigned to three judges as more severe. The latter assumption is attractive
if one considers the fact that sometimes ten or fifteen cases will be heard on the
same day, only one or two of them deemed "severe" by the prosecution, and still,
the increased punishment for all cases was found to be significant. As to the
finding that deserters represented by reserve service attorneys fare significantly
worse than those represented by regular service attorneys or private attorneys,
this can be attributed to the division of labor within the military defense, by
which regular service attorneys prefer to take the more appealing cases and
assign the less promising ones to reserve attorneys.
This assumption is very difficult to test, as different objectors may view their
objectives differently. The media coverage of the objection movement was
certainly more favorable, and less criminalizing, than that of desertion, but it is
impossible to establish whether this influenced the court's image of objectors or
resulted from it (Aviram 2004).
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